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WELLS V.LLOYD

denying the appellants' motion for leave to file a second
amended answer, considered in conjunction with the appellants' offer of proof, was not prejudicial.
These conclusions make it unnecessary to consider other.
points presented by the appellants.
The judgmEmtis· reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J.,
and Spence,. J. pro tem., concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied January
21,1943.

[L. A. No. 1841.8. In Bank.

•

[21 C.2d

Dec. 23, 1942.)

MYRON .H. WELLS, as Trustee in Bankruptcy, etc., Respondent, v. ELWOOD LLOYD ·IV et al., Defendants;
BANKOF AMERICA NATIONAL TRUST ANDSAVINGS ASSOCIATION (a NatIOnal BankIng Association)
. et al.,. Appellants.

, I·
I

[1] Appeal-Law of Case-Sufficiency of Evidence.-The doctrine
of the law of the case applies to a decision on the sufficiency
of the evidence.
.

,/
'j

[2] Id.-Law of Case-Nonsuit.-A decision by a reviewing court

that a .verdict could not be directed because of the conflict in
the evidence and inferences properly deducible therefrom
amounts to a ~ling that a finding of the jury for either party
could not. be dIsturbed because of the conflict; and it is law
of the case ·upon the question of whether the evidence is
sufficient to warrant submission of the case to the jury.
[1] See 2 Ca1.Jur. 967; 3 Am. Jur. 553.
l\!IcK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 1340; [2J Appeal and Err~r, §1338; [3] Appeal and Error, §1328; [4JAppeal and Error, § 1326; [5] Appeal and Error, § 1329; [6] Appeal
and Error, § 1324; [7J Appeal and Error, §§ 1641, 1644; [8]
Fraud, § 100; [9] Fraud, § 93(1); [10] Appeal and Error § 1088'
[11] Fraud, § 93.
'
,
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[3] Id.-Law of the Case-Obiter Dicta.-Onappeal from a judgment on a directed verdict, a determination as to the sufficiency of the evidence to justify submission of the case to the
jury may not be said to be unnecessary so as not to become
the law of the case where the appellant requested a reversal
with directions to grant a motion for a nonsuit.
[4]· Id.-Law 'of the Case-Decisions of What Court.-A decision
on appeal made by a District Court of Appeal constitutes the
law of the case after it becomes. final, and is binding on a subsequent appllal to the Supreme Court.
[5] Id.-Law of the Case-Erroneous Decisions.-The doctrine of
the law of the case applies even though the appellate court
may be of the opinion that the former opinion is erroneous.
[6] Id.-Law of the Case-Examining Record.-The doctrine of
the law of the case as applied to a determination With reference to the sufficiency of the evidence applies even though
.the evidence is not quoted or cited in the opinion.,
.
[7] Id.-Harmless and Reversible Error-Instructions-Conflictinglnstructions.-The material incorrectness in an instruction
as to an essential principle is not generally .remedied by a
correct declaration of the same principlein·another .instruction. But the giving of conflicting instructions does not warrant a reversal where the erroneous instruction contained an
abstract statement of law, and other .instructions·contained
a correct statement speciflcally adapted ,to the. ,facts,.and
where, from a reading of the charge as a whole,and· frQm a
reasonable construction from the standpoint of the probable
effect on the jury, it appears unlikely that the JUry.followecl
the general language.
..
..
[8] Fraud-Appeal-Harmless

and Reversible Error-Iiistrue:tions.-In a frand action, errors of,omissioninb1struetionidn
failing to inform the jury that it can cletermhlewhether .the
false statements were representations of fact .01:- mere· opiIi-;
ion, and in failing to include the element . of reliance, are
harmless where the omissions are supplied by other instructions.
[9] Id.-Trial-Instruction-ApplicabUity.-In· a fraud action,
an instruction that plaintiff would not be bound by what an
investigation would disclose where the jury found deception
preventing complete investigation, was supported by the
record.

[7] See 24 Cal.Jur. 856.

',-;
'

..~.

'
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[10] Appeal-,-Review-Persons Urging Error-Estoppel.-An ap~
pellant cannot complain on ,appeal of error in an instruction
given at the request of the respondent when an instruction
requested by him contains the same 'error.
[11] Fraud-Trial-Instructions-Conversations of Conspirators.

-An instruction as to the jury's consideration of conversations of alleged co-conspirators tending to inculpate' the
defendant bank was not subject to objection in view of the
caution as to the prior necessity of finding that the bank was
a party to the conspiracy.

, APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. John Beardsley, JUdge. Affirmed.
Action' by trustee in bankruptcy for damages sustained by
bankrupt by reason of fraud. Judgment for plaintiff affirmed.
'i

Freston,& Files, James A' 'McI.Jaughlin, G. L. Berrey, Louis
Ferrari and Edmund Nelson for Appellants.
Thurlow T. Taft, Tanner, Odell & Taft and Donald A.
Odell for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-The present appeal is the third in this
action. On the first a judgment for plaintiff entered upon a
directed, verdict was reversed on the ground that issues other
than that pertaining to damages should have been submitted
to the jury. (Wells v. Lloyd, 6 Cal.2d 70 [56 P.2d 517].) On
the second appeal a judgment of nonsuit was reversed by the
District Court of Appeal, which held that the evidence produced at the second ,trial was substantially the same as that
presented at the first tdal, that this court had decided upon
the first appeal that there was sufficient evidence in favor of
plaintiff to justify submission of the case to the jury, and
that the determination became the law of the case governing
the litigation. (Wells v. Lloyd, 35 Cal.App.2d 6 [94 P.2d
373 U A hearing in this court was denied. The facts underlying the controversy are set forth in the opinion of this court
on the first appeal.
[1] Defendants' principal contention on this appeal is
that the evidence was insufficient to warrant submission of
the case to the jury. Plaintiff relies upon the decisions of this
[10J See 24 Cal.Jur.870.
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court and the District Court of Appeal on the earlier appeals'
as conclusive ,determinations of this question under the'doc<_
trine of the law of the case. (See Gore v. Bingaman, 20 Cat2d~
118 [124 P.2d 17] ; Penzinerv. We~t Amenca~Pinance~ OO.~;.
10 Ca1.2d 160 [74 P.2d 252] ;Un~ted Dredg~ngqo. v. In-.
dustriaZ Ace. Oom., 208 Cal. 705' [284 P; 922] ; TalZyv. G(1,n~' _
ahZ, 151 Cal. 418 [90 P. 1049] ; 2 Cal.Jur.944~) Ail'appellate,
court's decision on the sufficiency of evidence comes, clearly
within the doctrine. (Berry v. Maywood Mut., :W;Oo.~o..;
One, 1a Cal.2d 185 [88 P.2d 705]; Estat~ of Baird, 19~, C~;"
225 [223 P. 974] ; Young v. Southern Pacific .Qo.; 189 Oal,: 746"
[210 P. 259]; Burr v. United Railroad~"J73 (Jal.21l [15,9:
P. 584] ; Raymond'v. Glover, 144 Cal. ,548 [78 r. 31 ;"W~a?ef',
v. Shell 00., 34 CaLApp.2d 713 [94. P.2d 364] ;'Frankm~v;,
Bank of America; 31 Cal..App~2d 666 [88 P.2d 790];¥'cOor.."
mick v. Great Western Power 00.,134 Cal:App. 705 [2~'P;2d_
322].) [2] Defendants contend, however, thatwhilet~iscom;
decided upon the first appeal that there wa~. suffiCIent e~
dence in favor of defendant to preclude a dlJ,'ect~d verdict"
for plaintiff, it did not determine that there ~~' sufficient evi~,
dence in favor of plaintiff to warrant submISSIOn of the case
to the jury. This, contention was made on the secoild appeal'
and in disposing of it, the District Court of Appeal declar~d:
"With this contention we cannot agree, because the SUPl'eme,
Court in the previous opinion in positive and linequivocal'
language directly states that the questions of proximate cause
and the existence or nonexistence of a conspiracy should have,
been submitted to the jury because the evide~ce in connection,
therewith presented debatable questions. arid left room- fora
reasonable difference of opinion." (W.ells ~. Lloyd, 35 Cal.,
App. 2d 6 [94 P.2d 373]at.p, 11.) Thex:,uli.ng ,by this eoui1.'.
that a verdict could not be dIrected for plamtIff because -of the ','
confl.ict in the evidence and the inferences properly deducible, '
therefrom amounted to a rilling that a finding of the jury in.
favor of either party could not be disturbed ,because of that
confl.ict. (See Raymond v. Glover,supra.) [3]' Defendants
also contend that the determination that there was sufficient evidence to justify submission to the jury was unnecessary to the
disposition of the first appeal and therefore did not become the '
law of the case. On the first appeal, however, defendants contended not only that there was evidence that defendants were
blameless, but that there wa." no evidence of fraud onthe part'

.:

-:
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of the bank. They accordingly requested that the judgment
be reversed with directions to the trial court to grant. their
motion for nonsuit. The issue of sufficiency of evidence in this.
respect was therefore properly presented to the court, and'
since the ruling thereon would guide the court below on a new
trial, it became the law of the case. (See Berry v. Maywood.
Mut. W. 00. No. One, supra; Westerfeld v. New York Life
Ins. 00., 157 Cal. 339 [107 P. 699J ; Porter v. Muller, 112 Cal.
355 [44 P. 729J j Gwinn v. Hamilton, 75 Cal. 265 [17 P, 212] ;
People's LUmber 00, v. Gillard, 5 Cal.App. 435[90 P. 556].)
[4] If there was any doubt after the decision on the first
appeal that the evidence was sufficient to support a verdict
for plaintiff, it was dispelled by the decision of the District
Court of Appeal on :the second appeal, for the question was
there squarely presented and decided and constituted the law
of the case after the decision became final. (Gore v. Bingaman, s.upra; Berry V. Maywood Mnt. W. 00. No. One, supra;
United Dredging 00. v. In,dustrial Ace. Com., s~tpra; Otten
v. Spreckels, 183 Cal. 252 [191 P. 11].) Similarly, any doubt
that the ruling on the first appeal established the decision on
the sufficiency of evidence as the law of the case was dispelled
by the decision on .thesecond appeal. It has been held that an
appellate court's decision' as to the effect of a judgment as
res judicata is the law of the case on a subsequent appeal.
(People v. Holladay, 93 Cal. 241 [29 P. 54, 27 Am.St.Rep.
186].) The District Court Clf Appeal's holding, therefqre, that
the law of the caSe had been estaolished by the decision of
this court on the first appeal is the law of the case on this
appeal.
[5] In an attempt to bring the. present case within the
rule that earlier adjudications of ail appellate court are not
controlling when the facts and circumstances on successive
appeals are supstantia:lly different (see Erlin v. National
Union Fire 111,8. 00., 7 Cal.2d 547 [61 P.2.d 756]; Sheets v:
Sou: thern Pacific ao~, 1Cal.2d '40$ [35 P.2d 121]; Estate of
Ba~rd, supra; Young v. Southern PacifiC 00., SUpra; Burns v:
Jackson, 53Cal,App. 3,15 (200P. 80]), defendants contend
that the present ease differs materially from that presented
()n the two former appeals. There. is no contention that the
evidence produced at the third trial differed substantially
from that pro~uced at the former trials. On the contrary, it
appears that WIth the exception of Elwood Lloyd's testimony,
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introduced only at the second and third.~ri~s, tbeevidence
was essentially the same at all stages of, tlJ.'e liti~iitioIi: Lloyd's.
testimony was merely cumulative and. was so C/laracterized
by the District Court of Appeal on the second appeal.(Wetl~··
v. Lloyd, supra, at p. 9.) Thus, defendants' conteilti6ri
.aniouritsat best to an assertion thatthe eVid,ence 'was :not fully'"
considered at the previous trials, that the appellate courts
erred in . their previous evaluations thereof, and .that the
former opinions do not refer to or deal with (Jertainmatiers
in the r~cord. The doctrine of the -law of the caseappIies everi.
thOugh the appellate court tiIaybe of,theopitiiQn.that.t1i~ ,
'former decision is erroneoUS . (Pen?iner v. W e8J Americ,a~
Finance 00., supra; HoffmaTi v. Southern'Pd:Cijic 00.,215
Cal:454; [11 P.2d 387] ; Newportv. HatiOn, 207;Cal~5i5 [279
P.' 184] ; McEwen v. New York Life In~, Co., 187. Cal.. 144
[201P; 577J j State of Baird, $upra;,Tdllyv. G!l.f;,ahl~ supra),
and [6] evidence in the record in the earIler: decision 'is not
'quoted or cited in the opinion. '(Estate 01 Baird, supra; WellS
Lloyd, supra.)
.
.
Defendants cite England v. Hospital Qf theGooa"Sa'moari~
tan, 14 Ca1.2d 791 [97 P.2d813], to supP9rtth(j~r contention
that the earlier adjudications on sufficiency of the evidence
are not controlling on this appeal. It w~s there held that if
the applicable rul~ Of laV\'; is altered.or:'cla~ifiea Inthe,.intervai
between the first arid second appeals the court on the second
appeal ~h9Uld decide, the case a,ccordingtQ t4~,i'Ule.as altere~;
or clari:fied~ There is no' que~tion .here ofch;~ng~,or clarffica-,
tiori of rules, but onlyof thl;l effect of an' :appeUate court's decisioi;i.on .tnesUf6.ciencyof. the evidence.·.·
.
[7] It is also contimded that the j:ndgment l~ho1ildbe re~ersed,beca:;use oferror~. COnit:tlitted.byth:e', tl'i~f ~o.l1rt,~~/i:n;
structi'ng .the jury. Attention is dir~ct¢d to, p~ai~#~:'s 'ii!str,nc- .
tioll 17,which in eft~ctinformedt~e.j~ry. thlJ.t 8;' false'repre.,
.seritatioh ,is. h'lgally. fra udulep.t '~whethe~'k:p.owUigly· Jjiade~'o'r'
whether made through. ign.o~/;lIl(Je, car~leSsJiesS ,. c)r' mistaIri\.~·'
PlaIntiff admits that this instruction was mOnebu~':iil' that it .
perIri.ittec1. the Jury to findagitihsttlle .llfitik 'r~glitdl~sS:of th.e·
question 'of good fiith, but (jontends .th.at'the:~rrof was rend-.
ered h~rmless byotherinstrJJ,ctions cbrtectti ·sta.tiIlg th.eta,,', " .
.'
Plaintiff's instruCtion 16 and ,defepcilw.t"s l~structiQn' 26-G
1>rope:rlyinforined, the' jury that to be .actionable tire false
statements or representations·.must: either hav~' been ~ade·ln,
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the knowledge that they were false or else have been unwarranted by the information of the person or persons making
them. Instruction 26-G added the following direction: "If
you :find that the allegedly false representatIons which plaintiff relies Upon were actually made in good faith and not
recklessly, you must bring in a verdict for the defendants
, . . . Since men are presumed to act in good£aith you must
,assume that all' representations, whether true or ~alse, w.er/il
made in good faith, unless the contrary is established by clear
proof and satisfactory evidence." Although defendants con •..
cede that instructions 16 and 26-Gtogether accurately state
the law as to fal,se representatigns, they contend that these
. instructions conflict with instruction 17 and were boUnd to
confuse the jury. If the statement to the jury of an essential
principle of law is materially incorrect, the error is n6tgert~
erally remedied by a correct declaration of the samepririciple
'in another instruction. (Sheets v. Southern Pacific Co., 21~
.Cal.. 509 [299 P. 71]; Starr v. Los Angele$ Ily. Corp.; 187Cal,
270 [201 P. 599]; Heydenfeldt v. Osmont, 17.8 CaL768 [175
P. 1]; Pierce v. United Gas db Electric Co.,. 161 C~1.176 {lIB
,Po 700] ; Soda v. Marriott, 118 Cal.App. 635 [5 P.2d 675}:
Zolkosk v. United States Farm db Land Co., 72 Cal.App. 63
. [236 P. 344].) It is ordinarily Jmpossible to determine which
of the. conflicting rules was followed by the jury. It does not
follow, however, that the giving of conflicting instructions
will always mislead. the jury and warrant a reversal. (Miner
_v. Dabney-Johnson Oil Corp., 219 CaL 580 [28 P.2d23] j Loeb
v. Kimmerle, 215 Cal. 143 [9 P.2d 199].) In reviewing instructions, the appellate court must read the charge as a whole
and give the instructions a reasolll:lble construction from the
standpoint of their probable effect upon the jury. (Douglas
v. Southern Pacific Co., 203 Cal. 390 [264 P. 237] ; Taylor v.
Pacific, Electric Ry. Co., 172 Cal. 638 [158 P. 119] ; Krohn v.
Patrick, 12Cal.App.2d 339 [55 P.2d301] ; 24 Cal.Jur. 856;)
Thus, in appraising the instructions given in Loeb v. Kim,merle, 215 Cal. 143 [9 P.2d 199], this court concluded that
the giving of conflicting or contradictory instructions was not
ground for reversal of the judgment when the instruction containing the misstatement of law was in,volved and. obscure as
compared with the clear and explicit charge embodying the
correct statement of law. In the present case instruction 17
contained an abstract statement of law while instructions 16
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and 26-G were ~pecificallyadapted to the facts of the case. It
is unlikely that the jury followed the general language -of
the abstract instruction' rather than the expli<iitand emphatic
charge applying the law to the facts oft~e particular situation. (See' Nickell v. Rosenfield, 82·· Ca1.App.3~9 .' [255 P.

760]',)

".

,;'

..... .

.

; : [8] It is- contended that instruction. 17 failed to inform
the jury that it could determine whether-the fa1sestatemen~s
-Were representations of fact or mere opinions. Simi1ar~~,
plaintiff's. instruction 15, defining the elementso~ ,fraud, ~s.
attacked' for failure to include the element ofrehance. T~e
iHleged errors, however, were errors of omission; and the omissions in both instructions were supplied by instru,ction 16 so
that no' prejudice res~lted therefrom.. (Miner. :v; . Dabne!i",iifohnsonOil Corp., supra; Soda v.Marriott, supr:a; People v;
Lang Transportation Corp:; 43 Ca1.App.2d 134 [110 P.2d
.'
. ' : ..
464]. ) [9] Plaintiff's instruction 19-]) informed the'jurythat 'if
it should find decept~on by the alleged conspirators that· pre~
ve~ted a complete investigation as to the truth of the repre~
sentations. plaintiff was not bound by what an . investigation
would disclose. Appellants do not challenge the rule enun:
ciat~d therein, but contend that there WIl:S no evidence 9fan y
q.eceptio~ to warrant the giving of the instruction. The instruction, however, is supported by the record. There was
evidence that Bay Cities proposed tb make an independ~nt
iri'vestigation of the value. of the bonds it was to receive; that
the: '.proposed purchase was approved by the corporation's
. board or directors on condition of their "being, satisfied as
to the . value";, that a committee composed of G.Behymer,.
n. Rishell and M. L.. Rishell was appointed by the board
of directors to make the investigation; .~hat defendants Com".
magere anq. Lloyd represented that Bay Cities would be abl~
to 'make the investigation while the deal was in escrow; ,that
J-. D. Rishell, president of the corporation,went to San Fr~n.;,
cisco to continue the investigation and before leaving instructed Stintin to get in touch with Behymer, the corporation is attorney, and open an escroW' that was ',hot to be closed
until his return; that Stintin failed to get in touch with Behy'::
IDer but did open an ~crow, and on the following day, ,defendant' Commagere obtained the certificates deposited therein
by Bay Cities and thereby in- effect closed the escrow. [10]

.r:
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Moreover, instruction 19 requested by defendant/:! related to
the same issue. It is idle for a party to complain of a~ e:rror
in an instruction given at the request of his adversary when
an instruction requested by him contains that error. (Yolo
Water & Power 00. v. Hudson, 182 Cal. 48 [186 P. 772];
George v. Oity of Los Angeles, 51 Cal.App2d 311 [124 P.2d
872]; Jesse v. Giguiere, 24 Cal.App.2d 160 [74 P.2d 310] ;
see 24 Cal.Jur. 870.)
[11] Defendants next complain that at plaintiff's request
the jury was instructed that conversations of alleged coconspirators could be taken into consideration in determining
whether the bank, even though no agent thereof was pre..'lent
at the conversations, was a party to the conspiracy. While instruction 13 could have been clearer it is not open to the interpretation of defendants. The jury 'Was expressly cautioned
that unless it first foUnd that the bank had been established
as a party to the alleged conspiracy, it could not consider the
testimony regarding the conversations as tending to inculpate
the bank. Plaintiff's instruction 11, allegedly including an
implication that ~ppellants admitted the perpetration of a
fraud by some of the defendants, likewise is not open to the
suggested construction. In referring to fraud, the trial judge
took care to add the qualifying words "if any," and in instruction 36 expressly cautioned the jury that' the existence
of fraud could be determined only from the evidence and
could not be inferred· from the instructions.
Other assignments of error in the giving and refusing .of'
instructions as well as in the admission of evidence and allowance of comments before the jury have been examined. Upon
a review of the entire record, it does not appear that the
errors, if any, resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (Const.,
art. VI, § 4%; Code Civ. Proc. § 475.) The trial court,
therefore,' did not err in denying defendants' motions for ,nonsuit, new trial, judgment notwithstanding verdict or the
motion to strike the evidence at the close of plaintiff's case.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson., C. J., Shenk, J., Crirtis, J., Carter, J., and Spence,
J. pro tem., concurred.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied January
21, 1943. Edmonds, J., voted for a rehearing.
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CALIFORNIA CASUALTY INDEMNITY' EXCHANGE
(an Inter-Insurance Exchange), Petitioner, v. INDUS·
TRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION and JANE G.
DUFFUS, Respondents.
[1] . Workmen's Compensation-Compensable Injuries--,.Transportation in Employer's Conveyance.-Where an employee, as an
incident of the employment, is furnished with transportation
to and :t;rom the place of employment and the means' of transportation are under the con1rol of the employer, an injury sustained by the employee during such transportation is Mmpen.sable.
[2] ·Id.-Compensable Injuries-Transportation In Employer's Conveyance--Agreement.-An agreement :by an employer to furnish transportation to employees. may be implied from, the
circumstances and from the uniform c011rseo£ ,conduct of the,
parties. An inference thereof maybe drawn from the facts
that the employee, when hired, understood transportation
would' be furnished, that on the first day of employment she
rode in a car, and that she was then informed that it was the'
company car and that a deduction from her wages for its use
would be made.

. [3] Id. - Compensable Injuries,- Transportation in Employer's
Conveyance--Agreement.-An inference of an agreement by
an 'employer to furnish employees with transportation is not
precluded by his right to withdraw the privilege at any time,
or by the employee's freedom to use other transportation.
[4] Id.-Compensable Injuries--,.Transportation in Oonveyance...:..
Incident to Employment.-Where transportation is regularly
furnished by an employer to' employees solely because of their
status as such, it-may be inferred that transportation depends '
on the fact of employment and is incidental thereto:
[5] Id. - Compensable Injuries- Transportation in Emplojer's
Conveyance - Employee's Payment. - An employer's agreement to furnish transportation to employees is not trans-'
. [1] Inju.ry while going to or coming'from work, notes, 10 A.:ta.:R..,
169; 21 A.L.R. ,1223; 24 A.L.R. 1233; 62 A.L.R. 1438; 87 A.L.R. 250.
See, also, 27 Cal.Jur. 383,
McK. Dig. References: [1-5] W orkmen'sCompensation, § 100;
. [6] Workmen's Compensation, § 77.

